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We present a two country DGE model and estimate it using Bayesian techniques 
and euro area and US quarterly data for 1977–2004. In analysing the current 
accounts we find that a lower US rate of time preference or a higher dollar risk 
premium could render the deficit sustainable, but that these could push the interest 
rate to the zero bound. Secondly, we find that fiscal policy is not sufficiently 
effective to improve the current account although the zero bound is not hit. 
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Yhdysvaltojen vaihtotaseen vajeiden sopeutuminen 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 9/2007 
Mika Kortelainen 




Tässä tutkimuksessa esitellään kahden maan DGE-malli ja estimoidaan se käyt-
täen Bayesin menetelmiä euroalueen ja Yhdysvaltojen neljännesvuosiaineistolla 
vuosilta 1977–2004. Vaihtotaseanalyysissä havaitaan, että aikapreferenssinasteen 
lasku Yhdysvalloissa tai dollarin riskipreemion kasvu voivat palauttaa Yhdys-
valtojen vaihtotaseen vajeet kestävälle tasolle, mutta samalla korko saattaa laskea 
nollakorkorajalle. Lisäksi havaitaan, että finanssipolitiikka ei kykene riittävän 
tehokkaasti vähentämään vaihtotaseen vajeita, vaikka korot eivät laske nolla-
korkorajalle. 
 
Avainsanat: vaihtotase, nollakorkoraja, koordinoitu politiikka 
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One of the main topics of concern in recent debate over economic policy has been 
the growing current account deficit in the United States. In practice, this means 
the United States is moving deeper and deeper into debt to the rest of the world. 
On the other hand, the rest of the world has been willing to finance the US deficit 
and invest in US dollar-denominated financial assets instead of, for example, 
investing in their own domestic markets. 
  The US current account deficit has grown in recent years and currently stands 
at 6.6% of GDP (see Bureau of Economic Analysis 2006). The deficit stems 
largely from the trade account, which has been substantially in the red. The 
current account deficit has raised US net foreign debt to more than 20% of GDP. 
This amounts to around 200% of the value of the country’s exports in goods and 
services. On the other hand, the US debt burden is lessened by the fact that 
outward investment from the United States to the rest of the world yields a higher 
return on average than inward investment in the US market. Thus, the US 
investment income balance (interest and dividends paid) has only recently moved 
into deficit. If the United States continues to accumulate foreign debt, however, 
the interest payments on debt will start contributing to a further deepening of the 
current account deficit. 
  Has the US current account deficit grown too large? Since the current account 
deficit is also the difference between domestic savings and investment, this 
question can be rephrased: Can the United States’ present consumption and 
investment demand be sustained at current levels of debt and capital? We may 
further ask what would happen if investors in the rest of the world were no longer 
willing to finance the US deficit. What consequences would this have for 
exchange rates and for the US and other economies around the world? 
  In the recent literature, the US current account deficit has been analysed eg by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Faruqee et al (2005), and Erceg et al (2005a). In 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) a stylised general equilibrium model is used to 
analyse the effects of an immediate adjustment of the current account deficit. This 
analysis assumes that the whole deficit is unsustainable and thus the adjustment is 
associated with large changes in real exchange rate and terms of trade. Moreover, 
the model does not incorporate any dynamic optimisation decisions and is thus 
more suitable for long-run analysis. 
  Erceg et al (2005a) use an open economy DGE model to analyse the 
quantitative effects of fiscal shocks on the US trade balance. They find that 
changes in fiscal policy have small effects on the US trade balance, irrespective of 
whether the source is a spending increase or a tax cut. They find also that an 
increase in the fiscal deficit of one percentage point of GDP causes the trade 
balance to deteriorate by less than 0.2 percentage point. All in all, their results  
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suggest that a large reduction in the US government deficit would not play a 
major role in correcting the current account imbalance. 
  Faruqee et al (2005) use the IMF's Global Economy Model to conduct some 
interesting simulations. In their baseline scenario, the US deficit returns to a 
sustainable level as the shocks that hit the US and world economies fade away. 
This baseline adjustment is seen as a relatively smooth process even though the 
real interest rate increases considerably in the United States. In an alternative 
scenario, a sudden portfolio reshuffling in the rest of the world results in higher 
US real interest rates, and a weaker dollar, with harmful effects on US and 
possibly global growth. They run a US fiscal consolidation scenario where the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced by 60%-points in the long-run by 
increasing taxes by 3 per cent of GDP over 15 years. Their results suggest that 
extensive and credible fiscal consolidation could have large and durable benefits 
by reducing the current account imbalance. In addition, they find that the more 
flexible exchange rates in emerging Asian countries could help to amplify the 
effects of US fiscal consolidation on the US current account deficit. Furthermore, 
they find that more competition-friendly policies in Japan and the euro area could 
improve the US current account balance by 0.2–1.0%-point. 
  In this paper, we examine what factors could trigger the adjustment and what 
kinds of paths of adjustment these imply using an extended version of the Euro 
area Dynamic General Equilibrium (EDGE) model developed at the Bank of 
Finland. EDGE model is a New Keynesian DGE model in which both households 
and firms make optimising decisions. This model is appended with new open 
economy features and is currently a two country model. As wealth accumulation 
is always taken into account in the model, we consider this type of model to be an 
ideal tool to analyse adjustment of the US current account deficit. 
  In matching the model to data, we apply calibration techniques to fix a 
number of the parameters in the model. We proceed with Bayesian estimation of 
the shock processes and their persistence as well as the coefficients of policy rules 
and adjustment cost parameters. Bayesian estimation has been recently applied in 
the one country case by Smets and Wouters (2003), Juillard et al (2004) and 
Adolfson et al (2005) and in the two country case by de Walque et al (2005) and 
Rabanal and Tueste (2005). After estimation of parameters, we compare the 
moments of the model to the data. In general, it is difficult to fit the model to data. 
We nevertheless get a reasonable fit, at least for the standard deviations of most of 
the variables. However, the model seems to have trouble producing some of the 
cross correlations in data. 
  In the following analysis, we utilise the estimated two country EDGE model
1 
to study the dynamic adjustment of the US current account deficit. We assume 
                                                 
1 The simulation properties of the model (in single country, small open economy version) are 
reported in Tarkka and Kortelainen (2001) and Kortelainen (2002).  
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that half of the prevailing current account deficit is unsustainable and ask what 
factors could generate the necessary adjustment of the US current account to this 
sustainable level.
2 Here, we focus on four different mechanisms: increased 
savings by US households, a bigger dollar risk premium for international 
investors, an uncoordinated fiscal policy tightening in the United States, and a 
coordinated fiscal policy tightening in the United States and simultaneous fiscal 
policy loosening in the rest of the world. 
  We find that if the adjustment happens through increased savings by US 
households, adjustment of deficit is quite abrupt. In the medium run, US 
consumption decreases considerably. On the other hand, US investment and 
exports increase, which boosts US output. Inflation decreases considerably, and 
the zero bound of nominal interest rate could become a binding constraint. In the 
rest of the world, both investment and consumption increase. The shock is 
calibrated to halve the US current account deficit, and the real effective dollar 
exchange rate weakens by over 20% in the first three years. 
  If the financial markets trigger the adjustment by increasing the dollar risk 
premium, this adjustment is less painful for US consumers. However, in this 
scenario the rest of the world inflation decreases substantially, and the zero bound 
of nominal interest rate could become a binding constraint for the rest of the 
world. 
  As a third alternative, we assume that US fiscal policy is tightened in an 
uncoordinated fashion. This reduces the US current account deficit but is clearly 
not sufficient to induce the needed adjustment. As a fourth alternative, we assume 
that both the US and the rest of the world use their fiscal policies in a coordinated 
way. In the United States fiscal policy is tightened while in the rest of the world it 
is loosened. This is not strong enough to halve the prevailing US current account 
deficits. However, neither uncoordinated nor coordinated fiscal policy will push 
the nominal interest rates close to zero bound, and the effects on private 
consumption are at least in the coordinated case relatively moderate. Finally, the 
changes in the US and rest of the world private consumption are smaller in the 
coordinated case than in the uncoordinated US fiscal policy case. 
  In reality, the world economy includes economic regions other than the 
United States and the euro area and therefore the calculations based on the 
estimated model are merely indicative. One source of imprecision is that the 
weight given to the US economy in the model is greater than its actual weight in 
the world economy. The calculations based on these estimation results 
nevertheless illustrate the effects of US economic adjustment on the rest of the 
world economy. 
                                                 
2 In various studies, the sustainable level of US current account deficit is estimated to be between 
zero and four per cent of GDP (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2004, Holman 2001 and Faruqee el al 
2005).  
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  All in all, the analysis suggests that perhaps several different shocks 
impacting through several different channels would be needed in order to bring 
about the needed current account adjustment. Moreover, these shocks would have 
to be much bigger and more persistent than those found in the data. In addition, 
the need for the adjustment lies not solely with the United States but also with the 
rest of the world. 
  The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we explain the 
workings of the dynamic general equilibrium model used in the analysis. In the 
next section, we estimate the model, and in section 4 we analyse the adjustment of 





Households are treated according to Blanchard’s stochastic lifetime model with 
endogenous labour supply. Consumption is derived from the household 
maximisation problem with no liquidity constraints, habit persistence or other 
forms of myopic behaviour. The instantaneous utility function is additively 
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where Et, cs,t, ns,t, ν, θ, and p are respectively the expectations operator conditional 
on information at time t, the period t consumption of a cohort born at time s, the 
period t labour supply of a cohort born at time s, the weight of disutility of 
providing labour supply, the rate of time preference, and the constant probability 
of dying. The stochastic variation in the rate of time preference is assumed to 
follow an AR(1) process as in Levin et al (2005). The periodic budget constraint 
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− , where  t , s w , ys,t, and zt-1 are the period t wealth 
and labour income of an agent born at time s, and the expected return on wealth. 
  The optimal consumption plan is obtained by maximising above subject to the 
lifetime budget constraint. This yields the first-order conditions, which are then 
substituted back into the lifetime budget constraint to yield the consumption 
function for each household. Aggregating as in Black et al (1994), enables us to 
write the aggregate consumption function as 
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where  Λ = 1–(1–p)/(1+θ) is the marginal propensity to consume. Ct,  Ψt,  
YDt = zt–1Ψt–1 + Yt, and Yt are respectively aggregate consumption, aggregate 
wealth, private disposable income, and output. We define aggregate wealth as the 
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I
t P,  K t, and χ are consumption deflator, 
indirect tax rate, output deflator, nominal wage rate, labour, net foreign assets, 
government debt, nominal interest rate, depreciation rate, investment deflator, 
capital stock and the equity premium. We further define private nominal 























δ − − + ω + ω +





t τ , NFN, and U are direct tax on wages, the net factor income on net 
foreign assets, and unemployment. ω1, ω2, and b4 are parameters. On the right 
hand side are we have the value of output after indirect taxes, income taxes, 
interest income, transfers from government, income from net foreign assets, share 
of capital income paid to the government, and finally depreciation. 
  The aggregate labour supply is obtained by aggregating the corresponding 
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where Ft and Nt are the total labour force and total population. 
  Blanchard’s model introduces finite lifetimes for households, which affects 
the relevant discount rate. The market rate of interest that the government pays on 
its debt is different from this. The difference results in failure of Ricardian 
equivalence. It is further assumed that income taxes are distortionary, which 
creates a tax wedge and affects the labour supply decision. This creates an  
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additional non-Ricardian channel. Blanchard’s model also provides a well-defined 
steady-state for international asset positions. 
  Households set new nominal wage contracts at stochastic intervals à la Calvo. 
Those households that can not set new wages are able to adjust their wages to the 
pace of past inflation, ie dynamic indexation applies. Thus, the firms minimise 
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where ρ, φW, 
new
t , i W , Wt, and  t W  are the discount factor, the Calvo probability of 
making new contracts, the new nominal wage contract, observed nominal wage 




There are several types of firms in the economy. In modelling the final goods 
sector we follow Laxton and Pesenti (2003). Final goods firms combine both 
domestic value added goods and imported goods with constant-elasticity-of-
substitution technology to produce private consumption goods, public 
consumption goods, investment goods and export goods. An example of the 
production function for private consumption goods is 
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where x is the domestic final goods firm. Intermediate goods are produced by 
firms h (domestic) and f (foreign).  () 1 , 0 C ∈ γ  is the weight of local value added 
inputs in the production of final consumption. θC is the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic value added goods and imported inputs. The minimum cost of 
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t P  are the prices of domestic value added goods and imports. The export and 
investment price deflators are derived similarly. 
  The intermediate firms combine labour and capital with Cobb-Douglas 
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t A  are output, capital stock, labour input, capital share 
of income, and the labour-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) level of technology in 
domestic intermediate goods firm h. The stochastic productivity shock, ηA,t, is 
assumed to follow an AR(1) process common to all intermediate goods firms. 
 Inventory  management  firms  minimise costs arising from the imbalance 
between realised production and the normal level of production implied by the 
Cobb-Douglas production function and the deviations of inventories from some 
exogenous reserve level 
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where  KI φ , KI, and KI are the adjustment cost parameter, inventories, and the 
exogenous reserve level. 
  The factor demands are modelled via capital and labour service firms. The 
capital service firms maximise the discounted present value of real dividends 
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t t t P / P p = . These firms face a translog 
adjustment cost function describing how costs arise in changing capital and 
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are adjustment cost parameters. 
  Labour services are provided by a firm that minimises a Rotembergian 
adjustment cost function. The representative labour service firm minimises a loss 
function for changes in labour and deviations of labour input from the optimal 
amount. Optimal level of labour demand is defined by inverting the Cobb-
Douglas production function. The firms minimise following loss-function 
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where ρ is the discount factor and φL is the adjustment cost parameter. 
  Furthermore, we assume that the prices of intermediate goods are defined by 
Calvo contracts. As with wage determination, intermediate firms that cannot  
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change prices are nevertheless able to adjust their prices to the pace of past 
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where φP is the Calvo probability that the firm will change prices. In the long run, 




The government sector does not optimise explicitly. It is characterised by the 
government budget constraint and two policy rules: the budget closure rule of the 
fiscal authority and the monetary policy rule of the monetary authority. 
Government budget constraint is defined as 
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where ηCG,t is the government expenditure shock and b1, b2, ω1, ω2, and b4 are 
parameters. The left hand side is government net lending. The right hand side 
comprises government income (direct and indirect taxes, capital income) and 
government outlays (government consumption, investment, transfers and interest 
outlays). We assume that the government consumption shock is stochastic and 
follows an AR(1) process. 
  The fiscal policy rule is imposed to guarantee that the dynamic budget 
constraint is binding. The income tax rule assumes that the government balances 
its budget in the long run through tax changes. As target variables in this fiscal 
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where τt is the coefficient of deviations from the targeted debt level and τ2 is the 
coefficient of deviations of net lending from targeted net lending. b3, g and π are 
the debt-to-GDP target, real growth rate, and the inflation target. 
  The monetary policy rule is used to pin down the growth rate of the 
undetermined price level. A Taylor-rule type of monetary policy rule is applied  
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where  r,  λ1,  λ2, and λ3 are respectively the real interest rate, smoothing 
parameter, weight of the inflation gap, and weight of the output gap respectively. 
ηR,t is the interest rate shock, which follows an AR(1) process. yt = logYt and y is 
the log of steady-state output. The central bank provides an anchor for inflation 
expectations by setting an explicit inflation target π. The monetary policy rule is 
a variant of the Taylor -rule (see Taylor 1993). 
 
 
2.4 Foreign  country 
The country blocks (home and foreign) are isomorphic. Trade linkages are used to 
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+ = , where the international factor 
incomes are modelled as interest on USD -denominated short-term debt. In a 
closed world economy, the domestic and foreign net factor incomes of net foreign 
assets sum to zero. Thus, the foreign net factor income is defined as 
t t t S NFN NFN − =
∗ . In addition, the net foreign assets of the home country are 
accumulated from the current account positions:  t 1 t t CA NFA NFA + = − . Foreign 
net foreign assets are defined as  t t t S NFA NFA − =
∗ . Moreover, we assume that the 
nominal exchange rate is determined by the uncovered interest rate parity 
arbitrage condition:  t , s
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+ , where St is the foreign 
currency price of home currency and ηs,t is a shock to the exchange rate premium, 




In a competitive equilibrium, households maximise their utility subject to the 
budget constraint, and firms maximise their profits subject to technological 




3  Matching model to data 
3.1 Data 
The euro area (EA) data is from Eurostat, ECB, OECD and IMF. Most of the EA 
series are unfortunately very short, starting from 1991. Therefore, we extended the 
historical data by chaining it with the AWM database (see Fagan et al, 2001). The 
US data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
OECD and IMF. Using these data sources, we built a database covering 1977q1 to 
2004q4. 
  Our model is a closed economy two country model, and the actual data 
includes EA, US and implicitly a third country (rest of the world). To cope with 
this discrepancy between model and data we adjust the observed data to match the 
model. We do this by first redefining the US exports and imports so that these 
match corresponding EA figures (adjusted with the exchange rate). To balance the 
GDP identity we recalculate US inventories as a residual. In a similar way we use 
the EA current account, net factor incomes and net foreign assets data to replace 
corresponding US data. 
  We estimate the model in two steps. First, we calibrate the structural 
parameters to be broadly in line with the existing literature. Second, we estimate 
the adjustment cost parameters, policy parameters and shock dynamics of the 




Calibrated parameters are shown in Table 1 below. Almost all variables are 
calibrated symmetrically. The capital share of income is typically found to be 
around 0.3–0.4. In calculating the ratio of nominal compensation to nominal GDP 
at factor cost we find that both the US capital share and the EA capital share are 
close to 0.4 on average in 1999–2004. The quarterly depreciation rate is assumed 
to be around 0.013–0.025 in the literature (see Cooley 1995, Smets and Wouters 
2003, Juillard et al, 2004 and Adolfson et al, 2005). We assume that the 
depreciation rate is symmetrically 10% per annum. With this depreciation rate, 
half of the new capital is depreciated in about seven years. Siegel (1992) finds that 
the equity premium in US data for the years 1800–1990 is roughly 3% p.a. We 
calibrate the equity premium to be symmetrically 4.9% per annum. 
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Table 1.   Calibrated parameters 
 
   EA  US 
Capital share of income  α  0.4 0.4 
Quarterly depreciation rate  δ  0.025 0.025 
Quarterly equity premium  χ  1.049
.25-1 1.049
.25-1 
Quarterly mortality rate  p  1/80  1/80 
Quarterly birth rate  b  1/75  1/75 
Quarterly growth rate of total factor productivity  ε  0.0043 0.0043 
Quarterly rate of time preference  θ  0.007 0.007 
Quarterly inflation target  π   1.02
.25-1 1.02
.25-1 
Disutility of labour effort  ν  0.19 0.19 
Targeted inventories/output  K  0.5  0.5 
Share of domestic value added goods in private 
consumption  γC 0.9  0.9 
Share of domestic value added goods in gov consumption  γCG  0.9 0.9 
Share of domestic value added goods in investment  γ1  0.85 0.85 
Share of domestic value added goods in exports  γX  0.75 0.75 
Subst.elast.(value added vs. imports) in private 
consumption  θC 1.5  1.5 
Subst.elast.(value added vs. imports) in gov consumption  θCG  1.5 1.5 
Subst.elast.(value added vs. imports) in investment  θ1  1.5 1.5 
Subst.elast.(value added vs. imports) in exports  θX  1.5 1.5 
Steady-state government real consumption to GDP ratio  b1 0.2  0.15 
Steady-state government nominal investments to GDP ratio  b2 0.02  0.03 
Steady-state government debt to GDP ratio  b3 0.6  0.6 
Steady-state government other income to GDP ratio  b4 0.22  0.12 
Steady-state government transfers elasticity to unempl  ω1  0.2 0.2 
Steady-state level of government transfers  ω2  0.21 0.11 
Indirect tax rate  τ
Y  0.14 0.07 
NAIRU U  0.08  0.05 





The mortality rate is calibrated to give a remaining average lifetime of 20 years. 
The birth rate is calibrated so that the annual population growth rate is 0.27%. The 
annual growth rate of total factor productivity is 1.7 per cent and thus the annual 
growth rate of the economy is roughly 2%. The rate of time preference is 2.8% in 
annual terms. With this rate of time preference, we see that the real interest rate on 
government debt in equilibrium is higher than the real growth rate. We also find 
that the sum of the pure rate of time preference and the probability of death 
exceeds the real rate of interest rate in the steady-state. The inflation target is 
calibrated symmetrically to 2% per annum. Currently for EA target of inflation 
rate is less than 2% while for US there is no explicit inflation target. 
  The disutility of labour is calibrated symmetrically to 0.19. This and other 
parameters in steady-state imply that the Frisch elasticity (elasticity of labour 
supply with respect to real wage) is close to 0.33 for EA and USA. These Frisch 
elasticities are close to those found in micro studies, which range from 0.05–0.35, 
and to the 0.33 used by Juillard et al (2004). The RBC literature, on the other  
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hand, has found higher Frisch elasticities. The targeted inventories-to-output ratio 
is set symmetrically to 0.5. 
  The share of value added goods in final goods production is calibrated 
roughly in line with the data. Erceg et al (2005b) find that the average share of 
imports in US consumption (investment) is around 9 (38) per cent. We calibrate 
the import share of consumption (both public and private) to be 10%. The import 
share of investment is set to 15%. Finally, we set the import share of exports to 
25%. The substitution elasticities between the value added goods and imports in 
final goods production is set to 1.5 for all final goods firms. This is at the lower 
end of estimates used in NOEM models, which generally range between 1.5 and 6 
(see Bayoumi et al, 2004, Erceg et al, 2005b and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). 
However, Bergin (2004) finds evidence of a unitary long-run elasticity. 
  The steady-state ratios of government variables are set to levels of last 




We estimate the adjustment cost parameters, policy parameters, and shock 
dynamics of the model by Bayesian methods. We assume that there are 9 
structural shocks in the two country model. For the EA we assume that there are 
productivity, government absorption, interest rate and preference shocks. Similar 
shocks hit the US economy. Finally, we allow an exchange rate risk premium 
shock. The latter may not have profound economic interpretation, as noted by 
Rabanal and Tueste (2005). However, we find it useful to include this shock to 
generate more variation in the real exchange rate. In estimation, we allow the 
shocks to be autoregressive processes. 
  With these nine shocks we explain nine observed variables: EA output, EA 
consumption, EA inflation, EA interest rate, US output, US consumption, US 
inflation, US interest rate, and the real exchange rate. The model variables are 
measured in efficiency units, eg output is divided by both population and the level 
of technology. The relative growth rate is used when we express exports in 
efficiency units. We write a dynamic equation for the relative growth rate that 
generates an additional unit root in the model. We take this into account in 
estimation by using diffuse priors. Stationarisation may leave some variables with 
trending behaviour in our sample. Specifically, both EA output and US output in 
efficiency units are increasing slightly in 1977q1–2004q4. Thus, we prefilter the 
observed variables by Hodrick-Prescott with a smoothing parameter value of 
10,000. This prefiltering removes the long-run trends from our data. 
  In order to estimate the model we assume certain prior distributions, which 
are based on our previous calibration exercises and existing literature. We  
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estimate the model in two steps in Dynare/Matlab, as in Juillard et al (2004). In 
the first step, we compute the posterior mode using the CSMINWEL optimisation 
routine by Sims. We then sample the posterior distribution using a Metropolis-
Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm to make sample inferences about 
the parameters. We sampled two separate chains for 40,000 periods, discarding 
the first 10,000. In order to assess convergence of the Markov chains, we use the 
potential scale reduction statistics described by Brooks and Gelman (1998). The 
multivariate statistics indicate that the parameters do convergence. The last two 
columns in Table 2 report the posterior means of the parameters and the 90% 
confidence intervals. 
  We assume that our priors for the standard errors of the stochastic processes 
have inverted gamma distributions. The priors of all other parameters have beta 
distributions. An exception is the level parameter in capital adjustment cost, 
which is only constrained from below and so we use a gamma distribution for it. 
The mean of the priors is set mainly according to our previous calibration 
exercises as well as the existing literature. We set a relatively strong prior for the 
level of capital adjustment cost. This is also set asymmetrically. We do this in 
order to invoke enough investment variation. Another asymmetry lies in nominal 
rigidities, which we assume to be more relaxed for the US. 
  The estimated posterior standard errors for preference and exchange rate risk 
premium shocks are lower than the priors. The posterior means of standard errors 
for interest rates are well above the priors. The stochastic processes exhibiting the 
most persistence are the productivity, government consumption, and exchange 
rate risk premium shocks. The persistence of preference shocks, and especially 
monetary policy shocks, is low. 
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Table 2.   Estimated parameters 
 
   Prior  Posterior 
   distribution  mean  Std mean 90%  interval 
Risk premium shock  εS  inv.gamma 0.5  ∞  0.3994 0.3056–0.4881 
EA productivity shock 
EA
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0138 0.0117–0.0161 
US productivity shock 
US
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0092 0.0072–0.0110 
EA gov spending shock 
EA
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0157 0.0135–0.0180 
US gov spending shock 
US
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0126 0.0108–0.0148 
EA interest rate shock 
EA
A ε   inv.gamma 0.25  ∞  0.6977 0.6162–0.7838 
US interest rate shock 
US
A ε   inv.gamma 0.25  ∞  1.086 0.9449–1.2134 
EA preference shock 
EA
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0024 0.0018–0.0029 
US preference shock 
US
A ε   inv.gamma 0.01  ∞  0.0026 0.0020–0.0031 
AR(1) in risk premium  S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.9048  0.8791–0.9315 
AR(1) in EA productivity 
EA
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.9787  0.9585–0.9992 
AR(1) in US productivity 
US
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.9859  0.9734–0.9988 
AR(1) in EA gov spend 
EA
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.8598  0.8169–0.8983 
AR(1) in US gov spend 
US
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.7203  0.6412–0.7850 
AR(1) in EA int rate 
EA
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.4092  0.3113–0.4817 
AR(1) in US int rate 
US
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.3166  0.2369–0.3911 
AR(1) in EA preference 
EA
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.7321  0.6758–0.7959 
AR(1) in US preference 
US
S ρ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.6676  0.6066–0.7396 
EA Calvo price  p φ   beta 0.25  0.025  0.3672  0.3358–0.3969 
US Calvo price  P φ   beta 0.5  0.05  0.5168  0.4627–0.5665 
EA Calvo wage  W φ   beta 0.2  0.02  0.1785  0.1542–0.2073 
US Calvo wage  W φ   beta 0.25  0.025  0.3253  0.2811–0.3630 
EA labour adj cost  L φ   beta  0.075 0.025 0.0983  0.0635–0.1361 
US labour adj cost  L φ   beta  0.075 0.025 0.1856  0.1365–0.2343 
EA lev in capit.adj cost  K φ   gamma 0.15  0.001  0.1542  0.1459–0.1623 
US lev in capit.adj cost  φ   gamma 0.05  0.001  0.0605  0.0564–0.0643 
EA chg capit.adj cost 
EA
K Δ φ   beta  0.25 0.05 0.1488 0.1041–0.1995 
US chg in capit.adj cost 
US
K Δ φ   beta  0.25 0.05 0.1083 0.0685–0.1439 
EA invent. adj cost 
EA
KI φ   beta 0.1  0.025  0.0968  0.0748–0.1181 
US invent. adj cost 
US
KI φ   beta 0.1  0.025  0.0768  0.0751–0.0770  
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   Prior  Posterior 
   distribution  mean  Std mean 90%  interval 
EA Taylor smoothing  1 λ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.5189  0.4416–0.5913 
EA Taylor infl gap  2 λ   beta  0.5 0.1 0.484 0.3676–0.6101 
EA Taylor output gap  3 λ   beta  0.5 0.1 0.6341  0.4957–0.7712 
US Taylor smoothing  1 λ   beta  0.8 0.1 0.2476  0.1767–0.3394 
US Taylor infl gap  2 λ   beta  0.5 0.1 0.3884  0.2799–0.4952 
US Taylor output gap  3 λ   beta  0.5 0.1 0.648 0.5268–0.7787 
EA debt in tax rule  1 τ   beta 0.01  0.005  0.001  0.0002–0.0016 
EA deficit in tax rule  2 τ   beta 0.1  0.01  0.0904  0.0726–0.1042 
US debt in tax rule  1 τ   beta 0.01  0.005  0.0036  0.0013–0.0065 
US deficit in tax rule  2 τ   beta 0.1  0.01  0.0669  0.0560–0.0763 
 
 
Bils and Klenow (2004) find frequent price changes in US data with half of the 
prices holding for less than 4.3 months. Álvarez et al (2005) find the 
corresponding median duration in price changes to be 10.6 months for the euro 
area. The posterior mean estimates are 0.37 for the EA and 0.52 for the US. These 
indicate that prices are changed approximately each 2.7 quarters in EA and each 
1.9 quarters in US. These estimates are close to the microeconomic evidence 
found for EA and US. With respect to nominal inertia in wages, the posterior 
mean estimate of the Calvo wage parameter for EA is 0.18, but for US the 
posterior mean is 0.33. These estimates could be interpreted so that wages are set 
in every 5.5 quarters in EA and in every 3 quarters in US. In addition, we notice 
that the posterior mean for wage adjustments is lower than the price adjustment, 
suggesting that prices are adjusted more frequently than wages. 
  The posterior estimates for labour adjustment are higher than the priors and 
the US labour adjustment costs are much higher. The lower the labour adjustment 
cost parameter, the higher the costs of hiring and firing relative to the costs of 
labour deviating from the optimal level. This could be interpreted to mean that the 
hiring and firing costs are higher in EA than in US. The posterior estimates of 
inventory costs are close to the priors and neither show any clear asymmetry. The 
estimated posterior means of the parameters of the level of capital adjustment cost 
increase slightly in comparison to priors for both countries, despite the fact that 
we effectively nailed them down. The posteriors of the parameters of the change 
in capital adjustment costs are somewhat lower than the priors and the US costs 
seem to be somewhat lower than EA costs. 
  In the Taylor rule, the priors of parameters for inflation gap and output gap 
are set to 0.5, as conjunctured by Taylor (1993). The estimated posteriors indicate 
that European monetary policy during the period entails more interest rate 
smoothing and reacts more sharply to inflation than US monetary policy. In the 
fiscal rule, the posterior mean estimates indicate that European fiscal policy over  
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In assessing the estimation of the model we consider how well the model fits the 
data. The stylized facts of the data and similar statistics for 50,000 stochastic 
model simulations (of which we discard the first 1,000) are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Observed and implied second moments 
 
 Data  Model 
Statistic US  EA  US  EA 
Standard  deviations      
   GDP  1.42  0.89  1.26  1.87 
   Consumption  1.07  0.87  1.11  1.68 
   Investment  4.55  2.89  3.08  2.73 
   Employment  0.93  0.68  0.3  0.45 
   Net trade  0.27  0.34  0.4  0.79 
   Real exchange rate  8.8  1.92 
Autocorrelations      
   GDP  0.86  0.87  0.72  0.74 
   Consumption  0.86  0.85  0.65  0.72 
   Investment  0.9  0.85  0.66  0.78 
   Employment  0.9  0.97  0.86  0.91 
   Net trade  0.81  0.81  0.69  0.69 
   Real exchange rate  0.86  0.68 
Cross correlations over countries         
   GDP  0.33  0.04 
   Consumption  0.14  0.02 
   Investment  0.19  0.01 
   Employment  0.19  0.02 
Cross correlations within countries         
   GDP – Real exchange rate  0.07  0.06  0.11  -0.33 
   Consumption – Real exchange rate  0.04  0.31  -0.07  0 
   Investment – Real exchange rate  -0.01  0.23  -0.14  -0.01 
   Net trade – Real exchange rate  0.39  -0.39  0.94  -0.96 
   Relative consumption – Real exchange rate  -0.18  0.04 
   Relative GDP – Real exchange rate  0.01  0.27 
 
 
The results indicate that our model is able to replicate reasonably the standard 
deviations and autocorrelations observed in the data. With respect to cross-
correlation structure, our model is at odds with the data. Nevertheless, this 
constrained set of structural shocks is able to produce moments which at least 
broadly agree with the data.  
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  With a closer look, we find that the standard deviations of EA consumption 
and GDP are clearly higher than in the data. The model's standard deviations of 
employment, net trade and real exchange rate are less than those observed in the 
data. Also, the autocorrelation coefficients produced by the model are somewhat 
low compared to the data. Cross correlations over countries are small and clearly 
at odds with data, as also in de Walque et al (2005). This suggests that the 
assumed trade linkages in the model are not sufficient to produce the observed 
cross correlation structure. 
  A second area of interest concerns the degrees of independence of the 
stochastic processes. In the estimation process we assume that the shocks are i.i.d. 
We report the correlation structure of some shocks in Table 4. Although 
correlation does not necessarily imply dependence, we find that the null of zero 
correlation coefficient is rejected for the contemporaneous government spending 
shocks. Also, the contemporaneous interest rate shocks are significantly 
correlated. 
 
Table 4.   Correlation between innovations over the two 
     economies 
 
US⇒EA  contemporaneous EA⇒US 
0.07 -0.08  -0.1 
-0.25 -0.46  -0.32 
0.03 -0.16  0.15 
-0.18 -0.29  -0.29 
 
 
The variance decomposition of the observed variables is shown in Table 5. We 
find no interesting spillovers across countries. The US shocks do not matter much 
for the EA economy and vice versa. This result is similar to that of de Walque et 
al (2005). 
 











EA  productivity  shock  0.1  0.29  0.6  0.13 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.29 
EA  preference  shock  0.01 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02  0  0  0  0 
EA  gov.spending  shock  0.61 0.38 0.12 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 
EA  interest  rate  shock 0.09  0.02  0.02  0.15  0 0 0 0  0.01 
EA  shocks  0.81 0.77 0.75  0.5  0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.35 
US  productivity  shock  0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.34 0.55 0.16 0.21 
US  preference  shock  0 0 0 0  0.02  0.14  0.04  0.05  0 
US  gov.spending  shock  0  0  0  0.01 0.48 0.27 0.13 0.15 0.01 
US  interest  rate  shock  0 0 0 0  0.12  0.04  0.04  0.32  0 
US  shocks  0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.22 
Risk  premium  shock  0.18 0.17 0.24 0.48 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.29 0.43 
Y, C, π, R and Q denote to output, consumption, inflation, interest and real exchange rate.  
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For both countries it seems that domestic productivity shocks are the most import 
source of variation in inflation. The second important source of variation in 
inflation is exchange rate risk premium shocks. Also, the domestic fiscal policies 
do matter, but their importance is of a second order. Regarding the variability in 
nominal interest rates, we find that all domestic shocks matter, but exchange rate 
shocks have huge impacts on the variation. The variability in output stems mostly 
from the domestic government spending shocks. The risk premium and 
productivity shocks are also important sources of output variation. Consumption 
variation is affected by factors similar to those for output. 
 
 
3.5  Impulse response functions 
Impulse responses for one standard deviation shocks are shown in Figure 1. In this 
figure we show how US specific shocks as well as the exchange rate risk premium 
shocks are transmitted. EA specific shocks look almost identical to US specific 
shocks and so we examine only US shocks. 
 
Figure 1.  Impulse response functions (% from baseline, 





US specific shocks do not seem to affect the EA economy. Only the exchange rate 
risk premium shock has considerable effects on both countries. 
  The output reaction of the estimated productivity shock is almost four times 
as big as in eg Juillard et al (2004). Except for the size, the only notable difference 
from the results of Juillard et al (2004) is that here labour supply reacts positively 
to the productivity shock. Erceg et al (2005b) report a productivity shock with the 
same profile, but their exercise is much more persistent and thus the reaction lasts 
for several years. 
  The results of the preference shock are close to the estimated policy version of 
Levin et al (2005). Employment declines as do the labour hours in Levin et al 
(2005). Consumption increases immediately, since we assume no habit behaviour. 
Inflation increases in the short run, but the short-run increase in the nominal 
interest rate is much more moderate than in Levin et al (2005). 
  Levin et al (2005) and Juillard et al (2004) report a very similar profile of 
their results for an expansionary government spending shock, but the effects are 
somewhat smaller than here. Erceg et al (2005b), on the other hand, apply an even 
bigger government spending shock than estimated here. 
  The output reaction of contractionary monetary policy shock is between the 
results of Christiano et al (2005) and Juillard et al (2004) or Erceg et al (2005b). 
US GDP inflation actually increases in the short-run before dropping from the 
baseline level. The US consumer price inflation that the central bank is targeting 
follows GDP inflation but reacts more rapidly to tightening of the policy. Most of 
the results of the monetary policy shock are in line with the findings of Juillard et 
al (2004). 
  The effects of the rise in dollar risk premium may be compared to the exercise 
of Erceg et al (2005b). The output, inflation and domestic absorption reactions are 
closely aligned with those of Erceg et al (2005b). 
 
 
4  Adjustment of the US current account deficit 
In analysing the adjustment of the US current account deficit we utilise the two 
country model developed and estimated above. We apply the model as if it 
describes the United States and the rest of the world. For the sake of argument let 
us assume that the United States’ present 6.6% current account deficit is 
approximately twice as big as the sustainable deficit. In other words, at least half 
the present deficit is temporary. Next, we can ask what processes could bring the 
deficit down to a sustainable level. As there are numerous possible channels that 
could lead to adjustment, it is important to consider whether the different 
processes would lead to radically different paths of adjustment.  
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  Among other factors, the speed and form of the adjustment process will 
depend on the response of monetary policy. In such calculations, it is impossible 
to avoid making simple and fairly mechanical assumptions as to how monetary 
policy responds to changes in the economy. In the present calculation we assume 
that the policy interest rate (short-term money market rate) responds both in the 
United States and in the rest of the world according to the Taylor rule. This rule, 
which is widely used nowadays in applied economic analysis to describe the 
‘normal’ response of monetary policy, assumes that interest rates are determined 
by how far the pace of inflation differs from the target (here assumed to be 2%) 
and how wide is the output gap. Including the output gap in the monetary-policy 
decision rule moderates interest rate movements and introduces a forward-looking 
element to the setting of interest rates, because demand pressure on the 
commodity and labour markets is one of the factors influencing future inflation. 
  Here, we examine more closely four different types of change that could 
cause the US current account deficit to adjust towards a sustainable level. These 
are (a) an increase in the level of household savings in the United States, (b) an 
increase in dollar risk premium, (c) an uncoordinated fiscal policy tightening in 
the United States, and (d) a coordinated fiscal policy tightening in the United 
States and simultaneous fiscal policy loosening in the rest of the world. In our 
calculations, these changes are implemented on such a large scale as to have a 
substantial effect on the US current account deficit. 
 
 
4.1  An increase in US household savings 
In the first calculation we assume that the US households’ become more worried 
about their future. This would lead them to increase their level of saving. In the 
model calculation this is taken into account by lowering households’ time 
preference rate by 1.8 percentage points per annum over the next thirty years. This 
has a direct impact on how US households in the model discount their future 
income and consumption. 
  According to the results of this calculation, an increase of 10 percentage 
points in the US household saving ratio would roughly halve the US current 
account deficit from its present level (see Table 6). The adjustment would also 
involve a lowering of US interest rates. GDP would increase, as both fixed 
investment and exports increase, compensating for the contraction in consumer 
demand. There would also be a marked deceleration in inflation in the medium 
term, which justifies the decline in interest rates. However, the fall in inflation is 
so pronounced that it pushes US nominal interest rates close to the zero bound. 
  As a consequence of this savings driven adjustment, there would be a little if 
any change in GDP outside the United States in the first five years. There would  
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be a substantial reduction in exports to the United States, but at the same time a 
marked increase in both consumption and fixed investment. This is a consequence 
of the strong downward trend in interest rates associated with this particular 
adjustment alternative. As the US current account deficit contracts, the current 
account surplus of the rest of the world would also contract in tandem. Under this 
scenario, the real effective dollar exchange rate would weaken over 20% in the 
first five years. 
 
 
4.2  An increase in dollar risk premium 
In the second calculation, we assume a receding willingness on the part of 
international investors to hold American assets. Technically this calculation was 
carried out by gradually raising the risk premium on dollar investments required 
by international investors to 0.5% on average for the next ten years. 
  According to the results of this calculation, the effective dollar exchange rate 
weakens by over 20% nominally and by over 15% in real terms in the first three 
years (see Table 6). The US current account deficit relative to GDP would 
contract by 3 percentage points, ie by almost half. This calculation also produces a 
vigorous increase in the American household saving ratio and a corresponding 
drop in private consumption. Rising interest rates, a direct consequence of the 
higher risk premium on the dollar, also means a decrease in fixed investments in 
the United States. The weakening dollar spurs net exports, which in turn boost US 
GDP, but only slightly. By reducing domestic demand, the rise in interest rates 
facilitates adjustment of the current account deficit. 
  In contrast to the previous calculation, this alternative has a considerable 
negative impact on inflation in the rest of the world. Hence the interest rate 
response is also sizeable. The dramatic weakening of the dollar raises import 
prices in the United States and, by extension, inflation, despite the rise in interest 
rates. At the same time, import prices in the rest of the world fall, reducing 
inflation to the same extent as the increase in the United States. If the dollar 
decline were to occur at once, as we assumed here, the fall in inflation in the rest 
of the world would be so steep that it would probably lead to deflation. The fall in 
interest rates produced by this model is so large that outside the United States a 
zero nominal interest rate floor could become a binding constraint. GDP in the 
rest of the world increases only slightly in this calculation, as the increase in 
consumption and investment compensates for the contraction in net exports. From 
economic policy perspective, however, the picture is not quite so favourable, since 
the world outside the United States ends up with deflation and a binding zero 
interest rate floor. 
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Table 6.   Dynamic adjustment of the US current account 
     deficit 
 
 US  household  saving 
ratio increases 






  1Y 3Y 5Y 1Y 3Y 5Y 1Y 3Y 5Y 1Y 3Y 5Y 
United States              
Current  account,  %  of  GDP  3  2.5 2.2  3  2.6 2.3 0.9 0.8 0.8  2  2.1 2.2 
GDP,  %  2.2  4.3  5.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 
Private  consumption,  %  -11.3  -9.3  -7.7  -3.1 -3 -2.8 2.3 2.8 2.7 0.7 1.1 0.9 
Private  fixed  investment,  %  18.1 20.8  21 -10.6  -7.5 -6.5 -6.2 -0.4 0.3 -8.4 -2.5  -2 
Household savings ratio,  
%-point  10.8 8.2  6.3  2  2.9  3.3 -3.3 -4.7 -4.7 -2.2 -3.3 -3.1 
Inflation (GDP deflator),  
%-point  -1.9 -1.7 -2.1 0.1  1  1.2  0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Nominal interest rate, %-point  -1.2  -2.4  -3  0.9  1.2  1.5  0.4  -0.4  -0.4  0.4  -0.4  -0.3 
Real effective exchange rate, 
%  21.5 21.9 20.8 16.7 14.7 11.4  4.6  5.2  5.1  10.8 12.9 12.9 
Nominal effect. exchange 
rate, %  19  15.8 12.5 17.5 20.3 22.2  4.6  4.8  4.5  10.7 12.2 11.8 
              
Rest of the world              
Current  account,  %  of  GDP  -4.2 -3.6 -3.2 -4.2 -3.8 -3.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -2.9 -3.2 -3.2 
GDP,  %  0.2  -0.7  -0.2  0.3  0.2  0.9 0 -0.3  -0.2  0.4 1 1.2 
Private  consumption,  %  8.5 7.7 7.9 6.3 5.5 5.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 0.1 -1.4  -1.7 
Private fixed investment, %  14.8  10.7  10.5  16.9  14  12.2  3.2  2.6  2.6  12.4  4.6  2 
Household savings ratio,  
%-point -7  -6.4  -6.7  -6  -7.2 -7.7 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4  1  3.9  4.6 
Inflation (GDP deflator),  
%-point 0.1  -0.5  -0.8  -0.5 -1.5 -1.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1 
Nominal interest rate, %-point  -1.2  -0.6 -1 -1.6  -1.9 -2.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.1 -0.2  0 
 
 
4.3  Uncoordinated fiscal policy 
In the third calculation, we assume that US fiscal policy is tightened in an 
uncoordinated fashion. Technically, we reduce US public consumption by one 
percentage point of GDP for fifteen years. Taking account of the estimated 
persistence of US public consumption shocks the effective decrease in public 
consumption is approximately 4%-points per annum for fifteen years. In addition, 
we suppress the fiscal rule for fifteen years, so that fiscal savings improve the 
fiscal balance by approximately 4 percentage points per annum. We assume 
further that the fiscal savings are fully used to reduce the US government debt. 
Thus, the US government debt-to-GDP ratio decreases by 60 percentage points in 
fifteen years. After this, we allow the fiscal rule to work. 
  According to the results of this calculation, an uncoordinated fiscal policy 
tightening in the United States improves the US current account balance by 
roughly one percentage point (see Table 6). As government expenditure is non-
productive in the model this reduction in government consumption generates a 
strong crowding in effect in US private consumption. Nevertheless, output falls 
because the decrease in government consumption is substantial. The dollar 
depreciates by about 5% in real terms. The US nominal interest rate and inflation 
change very little. 
  In the rest of the world both consumption and investment increase but there is 
very little effect on output. Inflation and nominal interest rates are almost  
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unchanged in the rest of the world. Thus, we find that the uncoordinated fiscal 
policy does not push the nominal interest rate close to the zero bound. 
  In carrying out the calculations of these alternative adjustment processes we 
noticed that a tightening of US fiscal policy on any realistic scale would not be 
enough on its own to halve the current account deficit. The impact is small 
because, according to economic theory, households respond to tighter fiscal policy 
by reducing their level of saving. This feature is included in the EDGE model. In 
the case of the United States, however, the reduction in the household saving ratio 
could be limited by the high level of household indebtedness. Nevertheless, as in 
Erceg et al (2005a) but unlike Faruqee et al (2005), we do not find fiscal policy to 
be a very effective tool to reduce the US current account deficit. 
 
 
4.4  A coordinated fiscal policy 
In the fourth calculation, we assume that fiscal policy is coordinated. In effect this 
means that the US fiscal policy is tightened while the rest of the world fiscal 
policy is simultaneously loosened. We implement this by tightening US fiscal 
policy as in the previous calculation but with equal-magnitude fiscal loosening in 
the rest of the world. 
  According to the results of this calculation, coordinated fiscal policies 
improves the US current account balance by roughly two percentage points (see 
Table 6). We see that even this falls short of halving the US current account 
deficit. US output is almost unchanged compared to the uncoordinated US fiscal 
tightening. The crowding in effect on US private consumption is now much 
smaller than in the previous case. Moreover, investment falls further now in the 
medium term. In the rest of the world, output increases slightly in the medium 
term. Private consumption falls due the crowding out. Private fixed investment 
increases in the medium term. 
  According to the results of this calculation, the effective dollar exchange rate 
would weaken nominally as well as in real terms by over 12% in the first three 
years. The nominal interest rate and inflation rate fall only slightly. Thus, we find 





Which of the above scenarios is the more favourable, and which the more likely? 
In the first alternative, the adjustment of the US current account deficit towards a 
sustainable level occurs through adjustments in economic fundamentals, in that  
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American households decide to consume less and save more. In this alternative 
the adjustment of the economy appears to be expensive in terms of consumption. 
Also, there is a marked fall in the US inflation rate and US nominal interest rates 
move close to the zero bound. If, on the other hand, adjustment of the current 
account deficit were to take place via the agency of the international financial 
markets, through a rise in the risk premium on the dollar, the change would be 
less dramatic for US consumption but would cause considerable pressure on 
monetary policy in both the United States and the rest of the world. Outside the 
United States, there would be a serious risk of deflation. Although an increase in 
the saving ratio would be a desirable development, it is unlikely. The household 
saving ratio has long been on a downward trajectory that even the recent dramatic 
price fluctuations in the share markets have done nothing to arrest. 
  In the third alternative, we assume that US fiscal policy is constrained in an 
uncoordinated fashion. This helps to reduce the deficit but it is clearly not enough. 
In the fourth alternative, we assume that both the United States and the rest of the 
world use their fiscal policies in a coordinated way. In this scenario, as in the 
previous one the reduction in the US deficit is not enough. Nevertheless, neither 
the uncoordinated nor the coordinated fiscal policy will push nominal interest 
rates close to the zero bound, and the effects on the private consumption are, at 
least in a coordinated case, relatively moderate. 
  The model calculations inevitably contain numerous simplifications. These 
include the assumptions that changes in exchange rates are passed on directly to 
import prices and changes in import prices are similarly passed on to final product 
prices in the domestic market. In practice, this is not necessarily the case. Thus, in 
the short run, the impact of exchange rates on inflationary pressures could be 
smaller. The outcomes of the calculations are also strongly influenced by the 
substitution elasticities in foreign trade assumed in the model. As is well known, 
estimating such elasticities from historical data is difficult, and the results tend to 





The present US current account deficit is probably higher than what could be 
considered sustainable. In the discussion above we began with the assumption that 
at least half the present deficit is unsustainable. 
  There are many different possible processes of adjustment of the current 
account deficit towards a sustainable level. Based on the calculations presented 
above, an increase in the saving ratio of American households would be an 
effective mean of adjustment, but it would be costly in terms of US consumption.  
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In addition, the US inflation rate would decrease rapidly and US interest rates 
would move close to the zero bound. In practice, adjustment towards a sustainable 
level could take place through a number of channels at once. It is, however, hard 
to imagine the achievement of balance without a reduction in US domestic 
demand. 
  Among other factors, the speed and form of the adjustment process will 
depend on the response of monetary policy. In these sorts of calculations, it is 
impossible to avoid making simple and fairly mechanical assumptions as to how 
monetary policy responds to changes in the economy. In the present calculation 
we assumed that the policy interest rate (short-term money market rate) responds 
both in the United States and in the rest of the world according to the Taylor rule. 
  The implications of current account adjustment for monetary policy depend 
largely on the precise route of adjustment. If the process is triggered by a 
contraction in total demand in the United States, monetary policy could be used to 
some extent to support total demand globally. However, if adjustment is triggered 
by the action of investors in the foreign exchange markets, monetary policy will 
face a much harder task, and the pressures it will face in the United States and 
elsewhere will push it in different directions. The monetary policy pressures posed 
by a balanced real economy would in fact be enormous. A zero interest rate floor 
would leave very little room for manoeuvre in monetary policy outside the United 
States. 
  Fiscal policy, either coordinated or uncoordinated, is not enough to induce the 
necessary adjustment in the US current account deficit. The coordinated fiscal 
policy would nevertheless improve the US current account by two percentage 
points of GDP, which is a considerable amount. Moreover, neither the 
uncoordinated nor the coordinated fiscal policy would push nominal interest rates 
close to the zero bound. Finally, the changes in US and rest of the world private 
consumption are in the coordinated case more moderate than in the uncoordinated 
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